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The Appellee, Daniel Baggett, by his attorneys of record, respectfully submits this 
brief pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This appeal arises 
from the Utah State Tax Commission's (the 'Tax Commission") Order dated June 26, 
2003 and its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision dated June 26, 
2003 ("Final Decision"). 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Daniel Baggett and his wife Vicki Baggett (collectively the "Baggetts") believe 
the issues on appeal and the appropriate "standards of review" are more properly framed 
as stated below, rather than as referenced in the Brief of the Appellant, the Salt Lake 
County Board of Equalization (the "Board"). 
ISSUE NO. 1 
Did the Tax Commission err by valuing the Baggetts' contaminated land at zero in 
accordance with the methodology the Tax Commission used in Schmidt v. County Bd. of 
Equalization of Salt Lake County, Appeal No. 96-0914 (October 7, 1997), aff d, Schmidt 
v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Equalization, 1999 UT 48, 980 P.2d 690? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
In affirming the Tax Commission's decision in Schmidt, the Utah Supreme Court 
noted, "[T]he choice of valuation methodology used in fixing the value of a property is a 
question of fact." Id. at \6 (citations omitted). This Court should therefore review the 
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Tax Commission's decision under the substantial evidence standard applicable to factual 
findings. Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(a) (2004); Schmidt at f6. 
ISSUE NO, 2 
Did the Baggetts present the Tax Commission with sufficient evidence under the 
Schmidt methodology to support the Tax Commission's Final Decision to value the 
Baggetts' land at zero? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
As discussed above, factual findings should be reviewed according to the 
substantial evidence standard. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
AND STATUTES 
Utah Const. Art XIII § 2(l)-(2). 
(1) So that each person and corporation pays a tax in 
proportion to the fair market value of his, her, or its tangible 
property, all tangible property in the State that is not exempt 
under the laws of the United States or under this Constitution 
shall be: 
(a) assessed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its 
fair market value, to be ascertained as provided by law; and 
(b) taxed at a uniform and equal rate. 
(2) Each corporation and person in the State or doing 
business in the State is subject to taxation on the tangible 
property owned or used by the corporation or person within 
the boundaries of the State or local authority levying the tax. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12) (2004). 
(12) "Fair market value" means the amount at which 
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a 
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or 
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sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant 
facts. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-301 (2004), 
The county assessor shall assess all property located within 
the county which is not required by law to be assessed by the 
commission. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103(1) (2004), 
All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a 
uniform and equal rate on the basis of its fair market value, as 
valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided by law. 
Utah Code Ann, § 59-l-610(l)(a) and (b) (2004). 
(1) When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings 
commenced before the commission, the Court of Appeals or 
Supreme Court shall: 
(a) grant the commission deference concerning its written 
findings of fact, applying a substantial evidence standard on 
review; and 
(b) grant the commission no deference concerning its 
conclusions of law, applying a correction of error standard, 
unless there is an explicit grant of discretion contained in a 
statute at issue before the appellate court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This proceeding is the Board's appeal of the Tax Commission's Final Decision to 
value the Baggetts' contaminated land at zero. In its Final Decision, the Tax Commission 
also sustained the Board's value of $244,900 for the Baggetts' house. Although the 
Board's characterization of the issues may suggest otherwise, this is a straightforward 
and simple property tax case. 
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For 2002, the Salt Lake County Assessor's Office valued the Baggetts' house and 
land at $364,900 ($103,700 for the land and $261,200 for the house). R. at 439. The 
Baggetts appealed their assessment to the Board based on the Tax Commission's decision 
in Schmidt. Id. Since much of this appeal is governed by Schmidt, a brief overview of 
Schmidt is appropriate at this point. 
Schmidt involved a residential home near the Baggetts' property that is also 
situated on contaminated land. The Schmidts appealed their assessed value to the Tax 
Commission under the theory that their property had a negative value because the 
remediation costs for their contaminated land far exceeded their property's total value. 
The Tax Commission agreed with the Schmidts' basic argument, but declined to reduce 
the total value of their property (house and land) to zero. Instead, the Tax Commission 
bifurcated the value of the Schmidts' property and reduced the value of the Schmidts' 
land to zero, but sustained the assessed value on the Schmidt's house. The Tax 
Commission reasoned that the house had some value since the Schmidts continued to live 
there, and because their house was not contaminated. Id. The Utah Supreme Court 
ultimately sustained the Tax Commission's methodology in Schmidt. Schmidt v. Salt 
Lake County Bd. of Equalization, 1999 UT 48, 980 P.2d 690. (See addendum). Like 
Schmidt, the cost of remediating the Baggetts' land exceeded the land's assessed value 
for 2002. 
At a December 3, 2002 Board hearing, the value of the Baggetts' property was 
reduced to $288,500 ($43,600 for the land and $244,900 for the house). R. at 439. At 
this hearing, the Baggetts were informed that Schmidt was not controlling in their 
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situation, which is presumably why the Board did not value the Baggetts' land at zero. R. 
at 96. 
On January 24, 2003, the Baggetts filed a Request for Redetermination with the 
Tax Commission to have their case heard de novo. R. at 438. On June 2, 2003, a formal 
hearing took place at the Tax Commission before Administrative Law Judge Jane Phan. 
On June 26, 2003, the Tax Commission issued its Final Decision which followed the 
methodology in Schmidt and valued the Baggetts' land at zero. Also, as was done in 
Schmidt, the Tax Commission sustained the Board's value for the Baggetts' house, at 
$244,900. R. at 178-187. 
On July 22, 2003, the Board filed its Petition for Judicial Review with the Utah 
Supreme Court. R. at 189. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (2004), the Board's 
petition was referred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. On November 10, 
2003, the Board filed a motion for voluntary dismissal, which the Baggetts opposed. In 
footnote No. 1 in its Brief, the Board indicates that it inquired of the Baggetts to see 
whether they would be willing to stipulate to a dismissal. The Board claims the Baggetts 
coupled any stipulation with conditions to which the Board could not agree. The Board, 
however, fails to indicate that the only condition the Baggetts required was that the Board 
follow Schmidt with respect to their property until it has been remediated. Accordingly, 
the sole reason the Baggetts opposed dismissal of the Board's appeal is the Board's 
refusal to follow the Schmidt case, thereby forcing the Baggetts to appeal year after year 
on essentially the same facts. The Baggetts believe the Board's resistance to follow 
Schmidt is unjust to them and others similarly situated. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1996, the Baggetts purchased a house near the mouth of Little Cottonwood 
Canyon for $390,000 using conventional financing. R. at 90-91, 235. The Baggetts' real 
property parcel number is 28-12-151-008. Their street address is 9682 South Quail Ridge 
Road, Sandy, Utah 84092. R. at 235. The Baggetts' house sits on .65 acres. The house 
has 2,858 square feet above grade and 2,210 square feet below grade, of which 1,989 is 
finished. R. at 238. Unknown to the Baggetts when they purchased their house, the land 
underneath and surrounding the house was and is contaminated with trace amounts of 
lead and arsenic, which presumably came from the Flagstaff and Davenport Smelters that 
were operated near the Baggett's property from 1871-1879. R. at 19, 20, & 217. Both 
smelters processed ore for lead and silver, taken from mines located near Alta, Utah. R. at 
217. 
The contamination was originally discovered in 1991. In 1992, the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the Utah Department of Environmental 
Quality ("UDEQ") performed preliminary investigations with respect to the contaminated 
property, and the Flagstaff and Davenport Smelter sites were placed on the CERCLA 
Information System List ("CERCLIS"). R. at 234. The Baggetts' property is located 
within the Davenport Smelter Site. R. at 217, 228-229, 247. 
In January of 2000, the EPA proposed that the Flagstaff and Davenport Smelter 
Sites be placed on the Superfund National Priorities List ("NPL"). R. at 217. Sometime in 
December of 2000, UDEQ sent a letter to affected property owners indicating that the 
Flagstaff and Davenport Superfund Site would be placed on the NPL. R. at 25, 252. The 
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letter also indicates that the EPA and the UDEQ intend to pay for any remediation costs. R. 
at 233. The EPA and UDEQ, however, are not required to pay for the remediation costs if 
funding is not provided for by Congress. R. at 30-32, 256. 
In 2001, UDEQ and the EPA commissioned a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility 
Study that identified the contaminants present in the area and the range/depth of the 
contamination. R. at 219. In May 2002, the UDEQ and the EPA issued its Davenport and 
Flagstaff Smelters Superfund Site Proposed Plan. R. at 215. In this Plan, the EPA 
established the action levels for the Davenport and Flagstaff Smelters Site, which are 600 
parts per million for lead and 126 parts per million for arsenic. R. at 26, 219. 
After a public hearing and input, the UDEQ and EPA decided upon a remediation 
plan. R. at 277. Under this plan, all contaminated soil in areas of non-native vegetation will 
be removed up to a depth of 18 inches and replaced with clean soil and similar landscaping. 
R. at 278. In addition, native vegetation will not be removed, but will be hand-excavated to a 
maximum depth of 18 inches and replaced with clean soil. R. at 277, 278. Once remediation 
has been completed, institutional controls, such as deed restrictions, may be placed on the 
remediated property. R. at 278. The Baggetts' property was tested in 1998 and was shown 
to have samples above the action levels for lead. The Baggetts' property did not have 
any samples that were above the action levels for arsenic. R. at 46, 283, 330. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
As noted above, the two primary issues in this case are very straightforward. 
Those two issues are: (1) whether it was proper for the Tax Commission to follow the 
methodology used in Schmidt, and (2) whether the Baggetts presented enough evidence 
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under the Schmidt methodology to support the Tax Commission's decision to value their 
land at zero. 
Despite the clarity of these two issues, the Board's brief winds its way through 
numerous arguments without fully satisfying the Board's primary burden to "marshal the 
evidence." As noted above, the issues in this case are to be reviewed by this Court under 
the "substantial evidence" standard, which means the Tax Commission's factual findings 
will be upheld if they "are supported by substantial evidence based upon the record as a 
whole." See, e.g., Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992). 
"Substantial evidence" is "that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate 
to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n., 1999 UT 90, f 7, 987 P.2d 594, 597. 
For an appellant to prevail under a "substantial evidence" standard, the appellant 
must "marshal the evidence," which means "one challenging the verdict must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict [or Tax Commission findings] and then demonstrate 
that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." 
See, e.g., Neeley v. Bennett, 2002 UT App. 189, f 2, 51 P.3d 724, 726; Morgan County v. 
Holnam, Inc., 2001 UT 57 n. 8, 29 P.3d 629, n. 8 (dismissing Morgan County's argument 
that Holnam's purchases of machinery and equipment were not made in the ordinary 
course of business because the County failed to marshal the evidence to the contrary); 
Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, f 15, 979 P.2d 338 (The challenging party "must marshal 
the evidence in support of the [trial court's] findings and then demonstrate that despite 
this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
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weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous."); Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT 
App 12, f 24, 973 P.2d 431 (the court of appeals does not review the trial court's factual 
findings where the party challenging those findings fails to marshal the evidence. 
Instead, the court of appeals must "assume that the record supports the findings of the 
trial court"). 
In its Brief, the Board does not meet its burden of marshaling the evidence. The 
Board simply lists the evidence which supports the Tax Commission's Final Decision, 
but nowhere does it adequately explain why such evidence is not substantial under the 
Schmidt methodology. Board's Brief at 20-22. The Board merely asserts that it 
presented evidence that is contrary to the Tax Commission's findings. Such an assertion 
does not make it clear why the Baggetts' evidence should not have been relied upon by 
the Tax Commission or how the Tax Commission abused its discretion, as a trier of fact, 
in accepting the Baggetts' evidence. Therefore, because the Board fails to meet this 
threshold burden, its main argument - that the Tax Commission's decision to value the 
Baggetts' land at zero is erroneous - must likewise fail. 
Even though the Board fails to "marshal the evidence," it nevertheless attempts to 
show that the Tax Commission's decision is erroneous by making numerous tangential 
arguments, which can be summarized as follows. First, the Board argues Mr. Baggett's 
testimony cannot be accepted because he is not a certified appraiser. Board's Brief at 17. 
Second, the Board thinks it should have prevailed before the Tax Commission because it 
presented evidence that supported a higher value for the Baggetts' land. Board's Brief at 
19. Third, the Board asserts the Tax Commission erred in applying the Schmidt 
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methodology to value the Baggetts' land because other jurisdictions have used different 
methodologies to value contaminated property. Board's Brief at 27. Fourth, the Board 
claims the value of the Baggetts' land cannot be zero since the Baggetts will not have to 
pay for any remediation costs and because the Baggetts did not submit an appraisal to 
support a zero value for their land. Board's Brief at 34. 
As was the case before the Tax Commission, the Board's characterization of the 
issues misses the mark; they are non sequiturs, and all of the Board's arguments can be 
dismissed as follows. First, at no point did Mr. Baggett testify as to his property's value 
or claim to be a certified appraiser. R. at 76-85. He truthfully admitted that he did not 
know the standards and techniques that appraisers use. R. at 86. But that was not the 
point of Mr. Baggett's testimony. Instead, Mr. Baggett's testimony was given to assist 
the Tax Commission in determining the proportion of the estimated remediation costs 
prepared by the EPA and UDEQ (not Mr. Baggett) that should be allocated to the 
Baggetts' property. R. at 282-290. Anyone having a rudimentary knowledge of 
mathematics could have done that task. Certainly Mr. Baggett, who is a professional 
engineer, is capable and highly qualified to perform such an allocation. R. at 76-83. 
However, even if Mr. Baggett were not so qualified, the outcome in this case would not 
change. Anyone capable of performing simple calculations would be qualified to present 
testimony as to the manner in which the remediation cost estimates are allocable to the 
Baggetts' property. 
Second, the Board essentially argues that because it presented evidence in support 
of a higher value, it should have prevailed before the Tax Commission. The Board, 
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however, forgets that it is not only the quantum of evidence but, more importantly, the 
quality of the evidence that is taken into consideration. Utah Ass 'n of Counties v. Tax 
Comm'n of Utah, 895 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah 1995) (emphasis added). Even though the 
Baggetts may have presented less evidence quantitatively, their evidence directly and 
persuasively showed the remediation costs attributable to their land exceeded the land's 
market value. 
Third, the Board argues the Tax Commission erred in applying the Schmidt 
methodology in this case. However, because the facts in this case are substantially 
identical to those in Schmidt, common sense and reason along with the constitutional 
principles of uniformity and equality require that the Tax Commission apply the same 
methodology in valuing the Baggetts' land as they did in Schmidt. Furthermore, the Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that the choice of which valuation methodology to be used is a 
factual decision left to the Tax Commission's discretion. Schmidt at %6. Thus, the Tax 
Commission's decision to apply the Schmidt methodology may not be overturned by this 
Court unless there is no evidence to support the Tax Commission's decision. As will be 
demonstrated below, there is substantial evidence on which to affirm. A trier of fact is 
free to accept the evidence it finds most persuasive, i.e., not all evidence is of equal 
probative value. 
Finally, the Board goes to great lengths to argue that, because the Baggetts may 
not have to pay for the costs associated with remediating their property, their land cannot 
possibly have a zero value. However, until the remediation is completed and the EPA 
and UDEQ have paid all costs and expenses, the Baggetts have nothing but promises. In 
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other words, the Baggetts do not have a legally enforceable right to force the EPA and 
UDEQ to pay for the remediation of their property. R. at 30-32, 256. Mere promises of 
possible future clean up does not change the present condition of the contaminated soil. 
The land's present value, not possible future value, is the base of present taxation. 
In addition, the Board argues that the Tax Commission cannot determine the fair 
market value of the Baggetts' property without using an appraisal, and since the Baggetts 
did not present a formal appraisal, the Tax Commission must follow the appraisal the 
Board submitted. This is defective thinking. An appraisal, especially the appraisal in this 
case, does not determine a property's fair market value when important facts are ignored. 
The mere label "appraisal" carries no probative weight. Fair market value is instead 
determined by consideration of all facts and circumstances surrounding a property, which 
an appraisal may or may not address. The Tax Commission gave the Board's appraisal 
due consideration but significantly noted that "none of the comparables chosen ... were 
contaminated." Final Decision f 11; R. at 181. In other words, the Board's appraisal 
"comparables" were not actually comparable to the subject property. Thus, the Tax 
Commission considered the Board's appraisal, but declined to follow it as it did not 
represent credible evidence. 
Having exposed the transparent and illusory nature of all of the Board's 
arguments, the Baggetts will address the two primary issues in this case. First, the 
Baggetts demonstrate that constitutional principles of uniformity and equality mandate 
the use of the Schmidt methodology in this case. Moreover, the Baggetts assert that 
common sense, coupled with the Tax Commission's discretion to choose which valuation 
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methodology best determines fair market value under the facts and circumstances 
presented are enough support, standing alone, to affirm the Tax Commission's decision to 
apply the Schmidt methodology. Second, the Baggetts explain that the Record proves 
they presented a prima facie case under Schmidt to support their land being valued at 
zero. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TAX COMMISSION PROPERLY FOLLOWED SCHMIDT. 
In Schmidt, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "We have held that the choice of 
valuation methodology used in fixing the value of property is a question of fact." 
Schmidt at f 6. Thus, as a question of fact, the manner in which contaminated property is 
valued for property tax purposes is left to the discretion of the Tax Commission 
depending upon the individual facts and circumstances of each case. Id. The Baggetts 
accept this principle and acknowledge that different facts may call for the application of 
different valuation methodologies. However, by the same logic, when a taxpayer 
presents facts that are substantially identical to those of a prior case, taxpayer reliance 
upon the methodology used in the prior case is appropriate. In other words, if the facts 
are the same, what rational basis supports using a different methodology rather than a 
methodology that has already been tested and upheld against challenge? If the Tax 
Commission were to use different methodologies for cases involving substantially 
identical facts, the risks are compounded that the Tax Commission either could or would 
violate its Constitutional mandate to ensure that property is assessed uniformly and 
equally. Utah Const. Art. XIII § 2(l)-(2) (emphasis added). 
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The converse of this principle has been recognized in Amax Magnesium Corp. v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 874 R2d 840, 842-43 (Utah 1994), in which the Utah 
Supreme Court held that if identical methodologies were used to value state and county 
property, "it is unconstitutional to give county property a reduction without giving state 
property the same reduction." Id. Theoretically, all methodologies are intended to arrive 
at the "fair market value" standard. Consequently, there is no constitutional violation per 
se in using different methodologies on identical properties. Yet the likelihood that 
assessments using different methodologies on substantially identical properties will 
violate constitutional requirements of uniformity necessarily increases the more disparate 
methodologies are used. This is because, as the Utah Supreme Court has recognized, 
different methodologies are based upon theoretical analyses that typically reflect different 
factual premises. "Residential, commercial, transportation, mining, and public utilities, 
etc., must be treated differently because of the economic conditions that give value to 
such properties." Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 188 (Utah 1984). 
Where the properties and corresponding facts are substantially identical, however, there 
is no rational basis for application of dissimilar methodologies, when one methodology 
has already been used, tested and upheld. 
This conclusion is consistent with the concept of "fair market value," statutorily 
defined as "the amount at which property would change hands between a willing buyer 
and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having 
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12). This 
statutory definition suggests that a property has but one "fair market value." If one 
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methodology yields one value and another methodology yields another value (as is often 
the case), the Tax Commission is obliged to decide which methodology best 
approximates the statutory definition of "fair market value" under the facts and 
circumstances. That is what the Tax Commission did in Schmidt, which the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed. Having made the decision that the Schmidt methodology best 
approximates fair market value in this type of case, the Tax Commission would risk 
arbitrary, and hence unconstitutional treatment of taxpayers, were it to abandon its prior 
decisions in determining fair market value when confronted with virtually identical facts, 
as is the case with the Baggetts. The constitutional principles of uniformity and equality 
demand consistency between taxpayers. Thus, the Board may disagree with how Schmidt 
was decided, and it may apply a different methodology under a different set of facts and 
circumstances; however, in this case, the principles of equality and uniformity mandate 
that it follow Schmidt. In its Brief, none of the Board's arguments advance any 
meaningful distinctions between the facts in this case and those in Schmidt. All of the 
Board's arguments cite to different factual circumstances and noncontrolling 
jurisdictions. 
Even if an argument can be made that the Tax Commission is not constitutionally 
required to use the Schmidt methodology, the decision to apply the Schmidt methodology 
is still a factual determination within the Tax Commission's express discretion. Based 
solely on the principles of common sense and stare decisis, the Tax Commission is 
entitled to apply the same methodology for similarly situated taxpayers. Thus, these two 
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principles represent a substantial basis for the Tax Commission's decision to apply the 
Schmidt methodology in this case. 
Having determined that Schmidt is controlling, or at the very least, within the Tax 
Commission's discretion, all of the Board's ancillary arguments as to value and the 
methodologies employed by other jurisdictions are irrelevant. Consequently, the only 
remaining issue is whether the Baggetts presented a prima facie case under Schmidt to 
support a zero value for their land. 
II. THE BAGGETTS MET THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF. 
To make a prima facie case under Schmidt, a taxpayer is required to prove that 
remediation costs for his or her land exceed the land's assessed value. In addition, 
Schmidt also stands for the proposition that it is only the land's value that may be 
reduced. As demonstrated below, the Baggetts presented substantial evidence to show 
that remediation costs allocable to their land exceeded their land's value. In addition, at 
no point have the Baggetts argued that their house's value should be reduced. 
In support of their claim, the Baggetts introduced evidence directly from the EPA 
and UDEQ as to the estimated costs for remediating the Davenport and Flagstaff Sites 
("Cost Estimates"). R. at 282-290. Arguably, these Cost Estimates, without any 
additional evidence, represent substantial evidence for the Tax Commission to have 
determined that the Cost Estimates allocable to the Baggetts' land exceeded the land's 
value. However, in an effort to assist the Tax Commission in better understanding the 
Cost Estimates, Mr. Baggett, a registered professional engineer with many years of 
experience, submitted a workpaper along with his testimony explaining how the Cost 
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Estimates should be allocated to his property. R. at 78, 290. Mr. Baggett's analysis was 
submitted merely to assist the Tax Commission in its evaluation of the evidence, and 
contrary to what the Board asserts, Mr. Baggett made every effort to make his allocations 
as precise and reasonable as possible. R. at 78. Mr. Baggett's analysis was never 
presented as an opinion of fair market value or as an appraisal. R. at 76-78. 
Moreover, Mr. Baggett is technically qualified to provide expert testimony as to 
the allocation of the Cost Estimates. As Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states, 
the purpose of such testimony is to "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence...." 
However, even if Mr. Baggett is deemed a lay witness, his analysis is still an appropriate 
form of evidence since his calculations are "helpful to a clear understanding of the 
witness testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." Rule 701 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence (emphasis added). The fact at issue in this case is what portion of the Cost 
Estimates are reasonably allocable to the Baggetts' property. After presenting his 
testimony and submitting his calculations to the Tax Commission, Mr. Baggett bolstered 
the credibility of his analysis by testifying that even if his analysis or the underlying Cost 
Estimates were off by 50%, the Cost Estimates allocable to his property would still 
exceed his land's assessed value. R. at 92-94. 
Accordingly, based on the testimony the Baggetts presented, the Board cannot 
make a plausible argument that the Baggetts did not present substantial evidence to 
support the Tax Commission's Final Decision. This is particularly true when you 
consider that a possible error of up to 50% would not change the economic determination 
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in this case. Such evidence is more than substantial and this Court should affirm the Tax 
Commission's Final Decision. 
CONCLUSION 
This is an easy case for affirmance. The two primary issues in this case are: (1) 
whether the Tax Commission properly applied the Schmidt methodology in this case, and 
(2) whether the Baggetts presented enough evidence under Schmidt for the Tax 
Commission to have ruled in their favor. As for the first issue, the Board may believe 
that other methodologies are more appropriate, but the law requires the Tax Commission 
to apply the Schmidt methodology in this case. Second, the Baggetts presented more than 
enough evidence to support a zero value for their land under Schmidt. Therefore, because 
substantial evidence supports the Tax Commission's decision with respect to both issues, 
this Court must affirm the Tax Commission's Final Decision. 
DATED this _2_ day of November, 2004. 
MAXWELL A. MILLER 
RANDY M. GRIMSHAW 
MATTHEW D. WRIDE 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Daniel Baggett 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
JEFF Ec VICTORIA SCHMIDT, ) 
Petitioners, ) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
v. ) AND FINAL DECISION 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION ) Appeal No. 96-0914 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, : 
STATE OF UTAH, ) Account No. 2812108014 
Respondent. ) Tax Type: Property Tax 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for 
a Formal Hearing on July 23, 1997. W. Val Oveson, Chairman of the 
Commission, and G. Blaine Davis, Administrative Law Judge, heard 
the matter for and on behalf of the Commission. Present and 
representing Petitioners were Mr. Jeff Schmidt and Mrs. Victoria 
Schmidt. Present and representing Respondent were Mr. Larry 
Butterfield and Ms. Lisa Martin, from the Salt Lake County 
Assessor's Office. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1.
 k The tax in question is Property Tax. 
2. The year in question is January 1, 1995 
3. The Salt Lake County Assessor originally valued the 
subject property at $789,370. Upon appeal to the Salt Lake County 
Board of Equalization, a value of $706,000 was determined. 
0030: 
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4. The subject property is located at 3660 East Little 
Cottonwood Road in Sandy, Utah. 
5. The subject property consists of approximately 2.7 
acres of land located in the interior of a residential area, and it 
contains a home which has approximately 4,4 56 square feet on the 
main floor and 2589 square feet on the second floor. The appraisal 
submitted by Mr. Schmidt would show a smaller square footage for 
the home, but the determination of the square footage is not 
material to the ultimate decision in this case, and therefore the 
commission does not make a specific finding regarding the exact 
size of the home. The home is a very nice home of very good 
quality construction, and it is in excellent condition. 
6. Petitioner and Respondent both agree that the general 
value of the property is $706,000. However, both parties also 
agree that there is lead and arsenic contamination on the property, 
so the primary issue is the amount of reduction, if any, of the 
fair market value of the property caused by the lead and arsenic 
contaminat ion. 
7. Petitioner submitted letters from the State of Utah 
Department of Environmental Quality and the United States 
Environmental protection Agency. Those letters and the information 
contained therewith indicate that Petitioners' property contains 
lead levels as high as 4,910 parts per million, and arsenic levels 
as high as 174 parts per million. The letter from Mr. Brad T. 
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Johnson, with the Division of Environmental Response and 
Remediation at the Department of Environmental Quality for the 
State of Utah indicates that "clean-ups or environmental controls 
in the Salt Lake Valley have been considered for lead 
concentrations greater than 500-800 parts per million (PPM) (or 
milligrams per kilogram [MG-GM]) and arsenic over 70 PPM or (MG-
KG) ." 
8. The levels of lead and arsenic on Petitioners1 
property are high enough to be health risks and are significantly 
greater than those which are considered for superfund cleanup. 
However, whether or not the superfund would pay for the cleanup is 
a question which cannot be determined, since those cleanup funds 
are allocated based upon a priority basis, and there is no 
indication that the property of Petitioner would rise high enough 
on the priority list to actually be cleaned up by the superfund. 
The superfund cleanup level is based upon those levels which may be 
hazardous to health and upon the numbers of people potentially 
affected by any hazardous materials. 
9. One of the letters submitted by Petitioner indicates 
that the primary concern for arsenic and lead concentrations of the 
level found on Petitioners' property is for small children because 
they are more susceptible to health problems caused by such 
contamination than are adults. Petitioners do have small children. 
-3-
£U00u052 
Dpeal No. 96-0914 
10. Notwithstanding the contamination on the property, 
>oth Petitioners and their children do reside on the property. It 
las not been closed because of the contamination. 
11. Petitioners were not aware of the contamination on 
the property until they were in the middle of constructing their 
home on the property. Petitioners had obtained construction 
financing for the home, but they were unable to arrange permanent 
financing after the contamination was discovered. Petitioners were 
denied permanent financing on the home by Zions First National 
Bank, First Security Bank, and Chase-Manhattan Bank. The reason 
for all of the declines was because of the inability to obtain 
satisfactory documentation on environmental hazards. 
12. Petitioner submitted an appraisal prepared by Mr. 
Tony Parkinson, of Bodell-Van Drimmelen, Appraisers. That 
appraisal used both the cost approach and a market approach, and 
then deducted from the values of both approaches ^a sum of 
$1,04 0,000 for cleanup of the contaminated land which exists on the 
property. Because the value without contamination was agreed to be 
$706,000, after the deduction of remediation costs of $1,040,000, 
Mr. Parkinson determined a negative value of $334,000. The 
deduction for cleanup of the contaminated property used by Bodell-
Van Drimmelen was based upon an estimate received from Sitex 
Environmental, Inc. Petitioners submitted an estimate signed by 
Mr. W. Ray Maxom, the office manager for Sitex Environmental, Inc., 
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which estimated the cleanup costs to remove 18 inches of soil, haul 
the soil to an environmental disposal site, pay the disposal fee, 
replace the soil with fill and topsoil, and place sod back on the 
property, would be $1,04 2,252.05. 
13. Respondent submitted an appraisal prepared by Ms. 
Lisa Martin, a staff appraiser for the Salt Lake County Assessor's 
Office. Ms. Martin had earlier determined the value of the 
property was $706,000. However, based upon a later appraisal, she 
analyzed a subsequent sale within the area which was right next to 
a contaminated parcel, and was previously part of a contaminated 
parcel. However, the contaminated portion was severed by way of 
legal description so that the parcel which was sold was not 
contaminated- Based upon that sale, Ms. Martin determined that 
there was a stigma to sales in the area of approximately 20%, and 
the property, therefore, had a value of $563,900. However, that 
value is based upon a sale which did not have any contamination on 
the parcel that was sold, and it assumes the subject property could 
be sold with such a stigma attached to it. That appraisal of 
Respondent also does not make any adjustment for the unavailability 
of financing, or the fact that anyone who purchased the property 
may be in a chain of title of contaminated property, and therefore 
subject to payment of the full costs of remediation of the 
property. 
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ANALYSIS 
The Commission is convinced that there is significant 
contamination to the property. There is uncontroverted evidence 
that the contamination is at such a level that it constitutes a 
health hazard. There is also uncontroverted evidence that 
Petitioners have been denied financing from three financial 
institutions because of the environmental hazards. 
The difficulty is determining the impact of the 
contamination on the fair market value of the property. 
The normal method of calculating the value of a 
contaminated property is to deduct the costs of remediation from 
the value of the property as calculated before any deduction for 
the contamination. If that were done in this case, it would result 
in a negative value as determined by Petitioner's appraiser. If a 
property had a negative value, that would also imply that the 
property was uninhabitable. 
In this case, the Petitioners and their family are able 
to reside in the home and live in very nice circumstances. 
Therefore, the home clearly has some positive value. As long as 
the home is not uninhabitable, it does have some value. 
One o? the methods which could be used to calculate value 
for this contaminated property would be to estimate a reasonable 
rental value for the home and estimate its value based upon the 
income approach to value. In this case, however, there was no 
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testimony or evidence of the fair rental value of the home or a 3 
similar home in a contaminated condition. Therefore, the 
Commission cannot make a reasonable estimate of the property based 
upon the income approach to value. 
The Commission has concluded that most of the harm to the 
value of this property is because of the contamination in the soil. 
The building is not contaminated and would be fine if it were in a 
different location. Therefore, the Commission believes the most 
appropriate way to value this property is to reduce the value for 
the land to zero, and to value the improvements at their 
replacement cost new less depreciation (RCNLD) . Based upon the 
appraisal of Ms. Lisa Martin, that amount is $398,166. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
The Tax Commission is required to oversee the just 
administration of property taxes to ensure that property is valued 
for tax purposes according to fair market value. (Utah Code Ann. 
§59-1-210 (7) .) 
Petitioner has the burden of proof to establish that the 
market value of the subject property is other than that as 
determined by Respondent, and also has the burden of proof to 
estblish the correct fair market value of the subject property. 
Where there are environmental hazards contained on the 
property, the normal method of valuation is to determine the fair 
market value of the property without such hazards, and to then 
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deduct the cost to ci 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioners have sustained the burden of proof to 
establish that the market value of the subject property is other 
than that previously established by Respondent- The Petitioners 
have further met their burden of proof to establish that the cost 
to cure the property should be deducted from its normal fair market 
value. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that 
the market value of the subject property as of January 1, 1995, is 
$398,166. The Salt Lake County Auditor is hereby ordered to adjust 
its records in accordance with this decision. It is so ordered. 
DATED this 7 day of () Cxdj^Y , 1997. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
W. Val Oveson 
Chairman 
3e B. Pacheco 
Commissioner* 
Pam Hendrickson 
Commissioner 
•*a-
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of a final order 
to file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission. If you 
do not file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, you 
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Jeff and Victoria Schmidt, Petitioners, v. Utah State Tax Commission, County Board of Equalization of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Respondents. 
1999 UT 48; 980 P.2d 690; 369 Utah Adv. Rep. 34; 1999 Utah LEXIS 88 
No. 970588 
May 14, 1999, Filed 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice. Chief Justice Howe, Justice Russon, and Judge Jackson concur in Justice 
Zimmerman's opinion. Justice Stewart concurs in the result. Having disqualified herself, Associate Chief 
Justice Durham does not participate herein; Court of Appeals Judge Norman H. Jackson sat. 
Disposition 
We affirmed the Commission's valuation of the property at $ 398,166. 
Counsel Brian J. Romriell, Steven E. Hugie, Salt Lake City, for petitioners. 
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., John C. McCarrey, Asst. Att'y Gen., Mary Ellen Sloan, Salt Lake City, 
for respondents. 
Opinion 
Editorial Information: Subsequent History 
Released for Publication June 4, 1999. 
Opinion by: ZIMMERMAN 
{980 P.2d 690} ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
P1 This matter is before us to review an order of the Utah State Tax Commission ("the Commission") fixing 
the assessed value on residential property owned by Jeff and Victoria. Schmidt and to review the 
Commission's denial of a request from the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization ("the Board") for 
reconsideration. Both the Schmidts and the Board challenge the Commission's valuation. The Schmidts argue 
that their property should be valued at zero due to contamination. The Board argues that the property's value 
should be higher than that fixed by the Commission. We conclude that neither the Schmidts nor the Board 
met their burden of showing that the Commission's valuation was not based on substantial evidence, and 
therefore, we affirm. 
P2 The property at issue is residential property located on East Little Cottonwool Road in Sandy, Utah ("the 
property").. The property consists of a home of approximately 7000 square feet located on 2.7 acres. The 
property is located at the mouth of Little Cottonwood Canyon near the site where a smelter operated briefly in 
the early 1870's, refining ore from the mines in the canyon. Tailings from the mill are present on at least some 
of the land in varying quantities. The Board valued the property at $ 789,370 for the 1995 tax year. The 
Schmidts then appealed to the Board to adjust its original valuation and notified the Board of the 
contamination on the property. An independent {980 P.2d 691} hearing officer for the Board reduced the 
value of the property to $ 706,000. The Schmidts then appealed to the Commission. 
P3 The Commission held a formal hearing. The Schmidts argued that because the property was 
contaminated with high levels of lead and arsenic, the market value should be reduced to zero. In support of 
their motion, the Schmidts offered letters from the Utah Department of Environmental Quality ("UDEQ") and 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). The UDEQ letter states that the three trial holes 
on the 2.7 acres show that the land contains lead and arsenic at levels well above those UDEQ deems 
warrant clean-ups or the putting in place of environmental controls. The Schmidts also offered as evidence a 
letter containing a bid from Sitex Environmental, Inc. ("Sitex"), indicating that the removal of eighteen inches 
of topsoil from the entire 2.7 acres, disposal of the contaminated soil, and replacement with clean soil would 
cost $ 1,042,252.05. The Schmidts submitted an appraisal that valued the property at negative $ 334,000, a 
figure reached by deducting the amount of the Sitex bid from the value that the Board had fixed for the 
property. Finally, the Schmidts relied on letters from several banks that had denied permanent financing for 
the property after the contamination was discovered. 
o 
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P4 In opposition to the evidence proffered by the Schmidts, the Board submitted several pieces of evidence 
including an appraisal from Lisa Martin, an appraiser for the Salt Lake County Assessor's office. Martin 
determined that the value off the land should be calculated by using the $ 706,000 figure and reducing it by 
20 percent due to stigma from the contamination. A 20 percent reduction for stigma is a standard appraisal 
technique. She valued the property at $ 563,900. The Board also disputed that it was necessary to remove as 
much soil as the Sitex bid suggested. It argued that because only three soil samples had been taken on the 
entire 2.7 acres, there was insufficient evidence to prove that the entire property was contaminated. 
Furthermore, the Board pointed out that there was no evidence that the EPA or UDEQ would require any sort 
of a clean-up on this residential property. Finally, the Board offered evidence that the problem had been 
partially cured when the Schmidts placed additional topsoil on portions of the 2.7 acres. 
P5 In its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final decision, the Commission found that the fair market 
value of the land was zero but that the fair market value of the home was $ 398,166, It explained this result m 
the following manner. While "the normal method of calculating the value of a contaminated property is to 
deduct the costs of remediation from the value of the property as calculated before any deduction for 
contamination . . . in this case, it would result in a negative value . . . . If a property had a negative value, that 
would also imply that the property was uninhabitable." Because petitioners and their small children live in the 
home, and "in very nice circumstances," the Commission reasoned that the property must have some positive 
value. The normal valuation methodology was not used because it produced a number that did not reflect 
reality. Since the Commission determined that the property had "value-in-use,Mi it came up with an alternative 
methodology. The Commission treated the land and the home separately. It did this because the building 
itself was not contaminated and the harm to the value of the overall property was due to the contamination in 
the soil; It therefore set the value of the land at zero and the value of the building at. $ 398,166, a figure 
reached by using the standard replacement cost new less depreciation method. The result was a valuation for 
the house and land of $ 398,166. 
P6 The issue before this court is whether the Commission committed reversible error in fixing the property's 
value at $ 398,166. We first address the standard of review. We have held that the choice of valuation 
methodology used in fixing the value of a property is a question of fact. See Beaver County v. {980 P.2d 692} 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 916 P.2d 344, 355 (Utah 1996) (holding that Commission's decision to reject a 
certain valuation methodology is a finding of fact). Therefore, we "grant the commission deference 
concerning its written findings of fact, applying a substantial evidence standard of review." Utah Code Ann. § 
59-1-610 (1)(a) (1996). Furthermore, "when reviewing an agency's decision, this court does n o t . . . reweigh 
the evidence." Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993). 
P7 Under this standard, we uphold the Commissions findings of fact if they are "'supported by substantial 
evidence based upon the record as a whole.'" Cache County v. Property Tax Div. of Utah State Tax. Comm'n, 
922 P.2d 758, 767 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added) (quoting Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852 
(Utah 1992)). "Substantial evidence" is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence which is adequate to 
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. See Cache County, 922 P.2d at 767; Utah Ass'n of 
Counties v. Tax Comm'n of Utah, 895P.2d819, 821 (Utah 1995); First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of 
Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990); Hercules Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 877P.2d169,172 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) In addition, a party challenging the Commission's factual findings bears the burden of 
marshaling all evidence supporting the findings and showing that this evidence is insufficient. See Kennecott 
Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381,1385 (Utah 1993); First Nat'l Bank, 799 P.2d at 1165. 
P8 Both the Schmidts and the Board challenge the Commission's factual findings. The Schmidts argue that 
the Commission erred in valuing the home and the land separately. The Board argues that the Commission 
erred in fixing the land's value at zero and argues that the Commission should have used the Board's 
valuation for the house and land, making a percentage reduction for stigma instead. 
P9 The Commission was not bound to accept either the Schmidts' or the Board's valuations; it "has the 
discretion to adopt a figure that [falls] somewhere between . . . polarized estimates." Utah Ass'n of Counties, 
895 P.2d at 823. What is required of the Commission is that it value the property based on its "fair market 
value." See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103(1) (1996)2 "Fair market value" has been statutorily defined as: "the 
amount at which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being 
under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge off the relevant facts." Id. § 59-2-
1_02(8) (1996).3 In arriving at the fair market value, this court has said that the Commission uses one of the 
following recognized approaches: cost, income, and market. See Beaver County, 916 P.2d at 347. The cost 
approach determines the property value based on its replacement cost less depreciation. See id. The income 
approach determines property value by computing the present value of anticipated income. See id. The 
\J >J v> I J 
http://127.0.0.1:49152/mb/lpext.dll/U^^ 6/16/2003 
LexisNexis(TM) CD Page 3 of 4 
market approach determines property value by examining the prices at which comparable properties have 
been bought and sold. See id. 
P10 The Commission stated that the "normal method" of calculating the value of contaminated property is to 
deduct the costs of remediation from the value of the property as calculated before any deduction for the 
contamination. However, the Commission decided not to apply the "normal method." Instead, it attempted to 
fix the value of the property in use. This court has never established a proper method for fixing the value of 
contaminated property. Other jurisdictions have. Some have applied a method similar to the Commission's 
"normal method." See, e.g., AlmorCorp. v. County of Hennepin, 566 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Minn. 1997) (holding 
that in {980 P.2d 693} cases where property is a Superfund site and experts agree that clean-up cost should 
be deducted from appraisal value, court should deduct clean-up cost from value of property); Westling v. 
County of Mifle Lacs, 543 N.W.2d 91. (Minn. 1996) (upholding tax court's reduction of value to zero based on 
reduction for clean-up). But others have not accepted that the cost of clean-up ought to be fully deducted 
from the value of the property. See, e.g., Boekeloo v. Bd. of Review of Clinton, 529 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Iowa 
1995) (finding that most courts that have fixed value of contaminated properties acknowledge that 
contamination has an adverse effect and require assessors to consider effect of contamination on property); 
Inmar Assoc, Inc. v. Borough of Carlstadt, 112 N.J. 593, 549 A.2d 38, 44-45 (N.J. 1988) (suggesting that 
appraisers view properties like special-purpose properties or consider value-in-use to owner); Bonnie H. 
Keen, Tax Assessment of Contaminated Property: Tax Breaks for Polluters?, 19 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 885, 
906 (1992) ("For varying reasons, the majority of cases have rejected taxpayers' assertions of zero or nominal 
value."); Peter J. Patchin, Valuation of Contaminated Properties, 56 Appraisal J. 7,13 (1988) (stating that it is 
not reasonable to conclude that contaminated property is unmarketable when it is being used for its intended 
purpose, but suggesting consideration of stigma and value-in-use).4 
P11 Here, the Commission made a judgment about the value-in-use of the home and the land. The evidence 
before it valued the property between $ 706,000 and zero. The Commission has the discretion to take that 
conflicting evidence into account and to arrive at a number in between. See Utah Ass'n of Counties, 895 P.2d 
at 823. It did so in this case. The Schmidts and the Board have not carried their burden of demonstrating that 
the resulting valuation is without substantial evidentiary support in the record. There was evidence in the 
record that the clean-up would cost over a million dollars. That evidence was not, however, very persuasive. 
The Sitex bid was based only on three soil samples on the entire 2.7 acres. It showed varying degrees of 
toxicity at the different sampling sites. The uniform property-wide remedy Sitex suggested was thus not 
tailored to the site. The Commission could have reasonably concluded that the bid was excessive. At the 
same time, the Commission had other evidence that the simple mathematical deduction of clean-up costs 
from the initial appraisal did not reflect the real usable value of the property, or the actual impairment that 
resulted from the contamination. The Schmidts brought new topsoil onto the property. They live on the 
property in a large house with their small children. They have a vegetable garden on the property and 
consume the vegetables. No agency had required any clean-up or had even done an evaluation of the 
property. Based on all this, we cannot say that the Commission's valuation was not supported by substantial 
evidence. The evidence is sufficient to convince a reasonable mind to accept it as supporting the 
Commission's conclusion. This is particularly the case where, as here, the propriety of the Commission's 
methodology of valuing the land and the house separately is a question of fact and not law. 
P12 In conclusion, we affirm the Commission's valuation of the property at $ 398,166. 
P13 Chief Justice Howe, Justice Russon, and Judge Jackson concur in Justice Zimmerman's opinion. 
{980 P.2d 694} P14 Justice Stewart concurs in the result 
P15 Having disqualified herself, Associate Chief Justice Durham does not participate herein; Court of Appeals 
Judge Norman H. Jackson sat. 
Footnotes 
Footnotes 
1 MValue-in-use" was defined by the Iowa Supreme Court in Boekeloo v. Board of Review of Clinton, 529 
N.W.2d 275 (Iowa 1995), when it held that "the transitory absence of a market does not eliminate value . . . . 
The mere fact that a property is unmarketable does not mean it has no value, especially when it is being used 
for its intended purpose." Id. at 278. 
2 Section 59-2-103 states: 
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(1) All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the basis of its 
fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided by law. 
3 Section 59-2-102(8) is now codified at section 59-2-102(9). The change to section 59-2-102 occurred in 
1998 and does not affect this case. 
4 The Board also argues that the Commission erred as a matter of law in reducing the value of the land to 
zero. It contends that the Commission should only reduce the value of property by the cost of a clean-up 
where the taxpayer has shown all the following: the land is contaminated, the taxpayer is required to clean up 
the land, and the taxpayer can show with reasonable certainty the cost of a clean-up. The Board relies on a 
Washington case, Weyerhaeuser Co, v. Easter, 126 Wash. 2d 370, 894 P.2d 1290, 1298 (Wash. 1995). We 
decline to adopt the l/Veyer/iaeusertest in this case or to mandate an element of the valuation methodology. 
First, we have heretofore declined to detail a methodology for reaching a fair market value as a matter of law. 
Second, Weyerhaeuser involved a paper mill which was required to install pollution control devices. Here we 
are dealing with the fair market value of a residential property. While the lack of a conclusive clean-up 
estimate may be relevant to fixing the value, we are not persuaded that its absence should mean that the 
contamination must be ignored, as Weyerhaeuser would require. 
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JUDGES 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice. Chief Justice Howe, Justice Russon, and Judge Jackson concur in Justice 
Zimmerman's opinion. Justice Stewart concurs in the result. Having disqualified herself, Associate Chief 
Justice Durham does not participate herein; Court of Appeals Judge Norman H. Jackson sat. 
AUTHOR: ZIMMERMAN 
OPINION 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
{1} This matter is before us to review an order of the Utah State Tax Commission ("the 
Commission") fixing the assessed value on residential property owned by Jeff and Victoria. 
Schmidt and to review the Commission's denial of a request from the Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization ("the Board") for reconsideration. Both the Schmidts and the Board challenge the 
Commission's valuation. The Schmidts argue that their property should be valued at zero due to 
contamination. The Board argues that the property's value should be higher than that fixed by the 
Commission. We conclude that neither the Schmidts nor the Board met their burden of showing 
that the Commission's valuation was not based on substantial evidence, and therefore, we affirm. 
{2} The property at issue is residential property located on East Little Cottonwood Road in 
Sandy, Utah ("the property").. The property consists of a home of approximately 7000 square feet 
located on 2.7 acres. The property is located at the mouth of Little Cottonwood Canyon near the 
site where a smelter operated briefly in the early 1870's, refining ore from the mines in the 
canyon. Tailings from the mill are present on at least some of the land in varying quantities. The 
Board valued the property at $ 789,370 for the 1995 tax year. The Schmidts then appealed to the 
Board to adjust its original valuation and notified the Board of the contamination on the property. 
An independent hearing officer for the Board reduced the value of the property to $ 706,000. 
The Schmidts then appealed to the Commission. 
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{3} The Commission held a formal hearing. The Schmidts argued that because the property 
was contaminated with high levels of lead and arsenic, the market value should be reduced to 
zero. In support of their motion, the Schmidts offered letters from the Utah Department of 
Environmental Quality ("UDEQ") and the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
("EPA") . The UDEQ letter states that the three trial holes on the 2.7 acres show that the land 
contains lead and arsenic at levels well above those UDEQ deems warrant clean-ups or the 
putting in place of environmental controls. The Schmidts also offered as evidence a letter 
containing a bid from Sitex Environmental, Inc. ("Sitex"), indicating that the removal of eighteen 
inches of topsoil from the entire 2.7 acres, disposal of the contaminated soil, and replacement 
with clean soil would cost $ 1,042,252.05. The Schmidts submitted an appraisal that valued the 
property at negative $ 334,000, a figure reached by deducting the amount of the Sitex bid from 
the value that the Board had fixed for the property. Finally, the Schmidts relied on letters from 
several banks that had denied permanent financing for the property after the contamination was 
discovered. 
{4} In opposition to the evidence proffered by the Schmidts, the Board submitted several 
pieces of evidence including an appraisal from Lisa Martin, an appraiser for the Salt Lake County 
Assessor's office. Martin determined that the value off the land should be calculated by using the 
$ 706,000 figure and reducing it by 20 percent due to stigma from the contamination. A 20 
percent reduction for stigma is a standard appraisal technique. She valued the property at $ 
563,900. The Board also disputed that it was necessary to remove as much soil as the Sitex bid 
suggested. It argued that because only three soil samples had been taken on the entire 2.7 acres, 
there was insufficient evidence to prove that the entire property was contaminated. Furthermore, 
the Board pointed out that there was no evidence that the EPA or UDEQ would require any sort 
of a clean-up on this residential property. Finally, the Board offered evidence that the problem 
had been partially cured when the Schmidts placed additional topsoil on portions of the 2.7 acres. 
{5} In its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final decision, the Commission found that 
the fair market value of the land was zero but that the fair market value of the home was $ 
398,166. It explained this result in the following manner. While "the normal method of 
calculating the value of a contaminated property is to deduct the costs of remediation from the 
value of the property as calculated before any deduction for contamination . . . in this case, it 
would result in a negative value . . . . If a property had a negative value, that would also imply 
that the property was uninhabitable." Because petitioners and their small children live in the 
home, and "in very nice circumstances," the Commission reasoned that the property must have 
some positive value. The normal valuation methodology was not used because it produced a 
number that did not reflect reality. Since the Commission determined that the property had 
"value-in-use," 1 it came up with an alternative methodology. The Commission treated the land 
and the home separately. It did this because the building itself was not contaminated and the 
harm to the value of the overall property was due to the contamination in the soil; It therefore set 
the value of the land at zero and the value of the building at. $ 398,166, a figure reached by using 
the standard replacement cost new less depreciation method. The result was a valuation for the 
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house and land of $ 398,166. 
{6} The issue before this court is whether the Commission committed reversible error in 
fixing the property's value at $ 398,166. We first address the standard of review. We have held 
that the choice of valuation methodology used in fixing the value of a property is a question of 
fact. See Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 916 P.2d 344, 355 (Utah 1996) (holding 
that Commission's decision to reject a certain valuation methodology is a finding of fact) . 
Therefore, we "grant the commission deference concerning its written findings of fact, applying a 
substantial evidence standard of review." Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 (l)(a) (1996). Furthermore, 
"when reviewing an agency's decision, this court does not . . . reweigh the evidence." Questar 
Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993). 
{7} Under this standard, we uphold the Commissions findings of fact if they are "'supported 
by substantial evidence based upon the record as a whole/" Cache County v. Property Tax 
Div. of Utah State Tax. Comm'n, 922 P.2d 758, 767 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992)). "Substantial evidence" is that 
quantum and quality of relevant evidence which is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to 
support a conclusion. See Cache County, 922 P.2d at 767; Utah Assfn of Counties v. Tax 
Comm'n of Utah, 895 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah 1995); First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of 
Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990); Hercules Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
877 P.2d 169, 172 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) In addition, a party challenging the Commission's 
factual findings bears the burden of marshaling all evidence supporting the findings and showing 
that this evidence is insufficient. See Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 
1381, 1385 (Utah 1993); First Nat'l Bank, 799 P.2d at 1165. 
{8} Both the Schmidts and the Board challenge the Commission's factual findings. The 
Schmidts argue that the Commission erred in valuing the home and the land separately. The 
Board argues that the Commission erred in fixing the land's value at zero and argues that the 
Commission should have used the Board's valuation for the house and land, making a percentage 
reduction for stigma instead. 
{9} The Commission was not bound to accept either the Schmidts' or the Board's valuations; 
it "has the discretion to adopt a figure that [falls] somewhere between . . . polarized estimates." 
Utah Ass'n of Counties, 895 P.2d at 823. What is required of the Commission is that it value the 
property based on its "fair market value." See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103(1) (1996)2 "Fair 
market value" has been statutorily defined as: "the amount at which property would change hands 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell 
and both having reasonable knowledge off the relevant facts." Id. § 59-2-102(8) (1996).^ In 
arriving at the fair market value, this court has said that the Commission uses one of the 
following recognized approaches: cost, income, and market. See Beaver County, 916 P.2d at 
347. The cost approach determines the property value based on its replacement cost less 
depreciation. See id. The income approach determines property value by computing the present 
value of anticipated income. See id. The market approach determines property value by 
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examining the prices at which comparable properties have been bought and sold. See id. 
{10} The Commission stated that the "normal method" of calculating the value of 
contaminated property is to deduct the costs of remediation from the value of the property as 
calculated before any deduction for the contamination. However, the Commission decided not to 
apply the "normal method." Instead, it attempted to fix the value of the property in use. This 
court has never established a proper method for fixing the value of contaminated property. Other 
jurisdictions have. Some have applied a method similar to the Commission's "normal method." 
See, e.g., Almor Corp. v. County of Hennepin, 566 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Minn. 1997) (holding 
that in cases where property is a Superfimd site and experts agree that clean-up cost should be 
deducted from appraisal value, court should deduct clean-up cost from value of property); 
Westling v. County of Mille Lacs, 543 N.W.2d 91. (Minn. 1996) (upholding tax court's 
reduction of value to zero based on reduction for clean-up). But others have not accepted that the 
cost of clean-up ought to be fully deducted from the value of the property. See, e.g., Boekeloo v. 
Bd. of Review of Clinton, 529 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Iowa 1995) (finding that most courts that have 
fixed value of contaminated properties acknowledge that contamination has an adverse effect 
and require assessors to consider effect of contamination on property); Inmar Assoc, Inc. v. 
Borough of Carlstadt, 112 N J . 593, 549 A.2d 38, 44-45 (NJ. 1988) (suggesting that appraisers 
view properties like special-purpose properties or consider value-in-use to owner); Bonnie H. 
Keen, Tax Assessment of Contaminated Property: Tax Breaks for Polluters?, 19 B.C. EnvtL 
Aff L. Rev. 885, 906 (1992) ("For varying reasons, the majority of cases have rejected taxpayers' 
assertions of zero or nominal value."); Peter J. Patchin, Valuation of Contaminated Properties, 
56 Appraisal J. 7, 13 (1988) (stating that it is not reasonable to conclude that contaminated 
property is unmarketable when it is being used for its intended purpose, but suggesting 
consideration of stigma and value-in-use).^ 
{11} Here, the Commission made a judgment about the value-in-use of the home and the 
land. The evidence before it valued the property between $ 706,000 and zero. The Commission 
has the discretion to take that conflicting evidence into account and to arrive at a number in 
between. See Utah Assfn of Counties, 895 P.2d at 823. It did so in this case. The Schmidts and 
the Board have not carried their burden of demonstrating that the resulting valuation is without 
substantial evidentiary support in the record. There was evidence in the record that the clean-up 
would cost over a million dollars. That evidence was not, however, very persuasive. The Sitex 
bid was based only on three soil samples on the entire 2.7 acres. It showed varying degrees of 
toxicity at the different sampling sites. The uniform property-wide remedy Sitex suggested was 
thus not tailored to the site. The Commission could have reasonably concluded that the bid was 
excessive. At the same time, the Commission had other evidence that the simple mathematical 
deduction of clean-up costs from the initial appraisal did not reflect the real usable value of the 
property, or the actual impairment that resulted from the contamination. The Schmidts brought 
new topsoil onto the property. They live on the property in a large house with their small 
children. They have a vegetable garden on the property and consume the vegetables. No agency 
had required any clean-up or had even done an evaluation of the property. Based on all this, we 
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cannot say that the Commission's valuation was not supported by substantial evidence. The 
evidence is sufficient to convince a reasonable mind to accept it as supporting the Commission's 
conclusion. This is particularly the case where, as here, the propriety of the Commission's 
methodology of valuing the land and the house separately is a question of fact and not law. 
{12} In conclusion, we affirm the Commission's valuation of the property at $ 398,166. 
{13} Chief Justice Howe, Justice Russon, and Judge Jackson concur in Justice Zimmerman's 
opinion. 
PI4 Justice Stewart concurs in the result 
{15} Having disqualified herself, Associate Chief Justice Durham does not participate 
herein; Court of Appeals Judge Norman H. Jackson sat. 
DISPOSITION 
We affirmed the Commission's valuation of the property at $ 398,166. 
OPINION FOOTNOTES 
1 "Vaiue-in-use" was defined by the Iowa Supreme Court in Boekeloo v. Board of Review of 
Clinton, 529 N.W.2d 275 (Iowa 1995), when it held that "the transitory absence of a market does not 
eliminate value . . . . The mere fact that a property is unmarketable does not mean it has no value, 
especially when it is being used for its intended purpose." Id. at 278. 
2 Section 59-2-103 states: 
(1) All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the basis 
of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided by Jaw. 
3 Section 59-2-102(8) is now codified at section 59-2-102(9). The change to section 59-2-102 
occurred in 1998 and does not affect this case. 
4 The Board also argues that the Commission erred as a matter of law in reducing the value of the 
land to zero, it contends that the Commission should only reduce the value of property by the cost of a 
clean-up where the taxpayer has shown all the following: the land is contaminated, the taxpayer is 
required to clean up the land, and the taxpayer can show with reasonable certainty the cost of a clean-up. 
The Board relies on a Washington case, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Easter, 126 Wash. 2d 370, 894 P.2d 
1290, 1298 (Wash. 1995) . We decline to adopt the Weyerhaeuser test in this case or to mandate an 
element of the valuation methodology. First, we have heretofore declined to detail a methodology for 
reaching a fair market value as a matter of law. Second, Weyerhaeuser involved a paper mill which was 
required to install pollution control devices. Here we are dealing with the fair market value of a residential 
property. While the lack of a conclusive clean-up estimate may be relevant to fixing the value, we are not 
persuaded that its absence should mean that the contamination must be ignored, as Weyerhaeuser 
would require. 
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